

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 NEA-11 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 ( ISO ) W  
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P R 112032Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1565

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 1189

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TEXT OF ALLIED STATEMENT FOR  
FEBRUARY 12 PLENARY

TEXT OF SECOND STATEMENT ON COMMON CEILING TO BE DELIVERED  
BY NETHERLANDS REP FOR ALLIES WAS AGREED BY AD HOC GROUP  
FEB 11 FOR DELIVERY FEB 12.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

1. I SHOULD LIKE TODAY TO RETURN TO THE CONCEPT  
OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE  
MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE ABOUT WHICH MY BRITISH  
COLLEAGUE SPOKE ON THE 31ST OF JANUARY, AND TO  
EXPLAIN IN GREATER DETAIL WHY MY COLLEAGUES AND I  
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BELIEVE THAT SUCH A COMMON CEILING IS NOT ONLY A

JUST AND EQUITABLE GOAL FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS BUT ALSO A PRACTICABLE AND ATTAINABLE ONE.

2. MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE, IN HIS STATEMENT TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED, DESCRIBED THIS CONCEPT AS CENTRAL TO THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD. IT IS THE PRACTICAL EXPRESSION OF OUR CONVICTION THAT THE END RESULT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IF IT IS TO PROVE ACCEPTABLE AND LASTING, MUST BE A MORE NEARLY EQUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN EXISTS AT PRESET. IT IS THE ONLY OUTCOME WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD BE DEMONSTRABLY EQUITABLE AND ON WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD RELY TO ENSURE THEIR SECURITY. IT IS THUS THE ONLY OUTCOME WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS FOR THE JUST AND DURABLE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WE BELIEVE IT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF BOTH SIDES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE.

3. LET ME RECALL BRIEFLY THE DETAILS OF THIS PROPOSAL. IT IS THAT THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TALKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY; AND WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE.

4. BECAUSE WE THINK THAT THIS IS TOO AMBITIOUS A RESULT TO ARRIVE AT IN ONE SINGLE STEP, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE REDUCTIONS TO THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. WE SEE THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AS REPRESENTING THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE COMMON CEILING WE HAVE PROPOSED. IT WOULD, THEREFORE, INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF SUCH A COMMON CEILING AND ALSO SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR CONTINUATION

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OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED TO MAKE THE COMMON CEILING A REALITY. IT IS IN THIS SECOND PHASE THAT THE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE INCLUDED.

5. OUR PROPOSALS ON THESE POINTS SEEM TO US CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. I HAVE REHEARSED THEM AGAIN IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT TWO IMPORTANT POINTS. THE FIRST IS THAT

THE WESTERN COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, A COMMITMENT WHICH WE WISH TO SEE WRITTEN INTO A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, IS THE GUARANTEE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE AND TO BRING THEM TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. SINCE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPRESSED MISGIVINGS ON THIS SCORE, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE THIS POINT CLEAR BEYOND ALL POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING. OUR PROPOSALS FORM AN INTEGRATED WHOLE, IN WHICH THE COMMON CEILING IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE. WITHOUT THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE COMMON CEILING WOULD BE UNOBTAINABLE.

6. SECONDLY: BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE COMMON CEILING WE HAVE PROPOSED IS THE GUARANTEE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO INCLUDE IN THE REDUCTIONS THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY BASIS OF CONFIDENCE FOR INCLUDING REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; FOR ALL CONCERNED WOULD THEN KNOW THAT THE END RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS TO WHICH THEY WERE COMMITTING THEMSELVES WOULD BE AN EQUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE. MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE TOTAL REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS EQUAL END RESULT MUST INCLUDE, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN ADDITION TO THOSE OF THE US.

IT SHOULD, I THINK, BE CLEAR FROM WHAT I AND MY  
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COLLEAGUES HAVE SAID THAT THE TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS WHICH WE PROPOSE WOULD BE CUMULATIVE, LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CEILING. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY PROVISION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE, BUT ALSO AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AS THE GOAL OF THE SECOND PHASE.

7. IT IS A MAJOR PURPOSE OF OUR PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE FUTURE SIZE OF THE GROUND FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, THUS PRECLUDING ANY UNCONTROLLED EXPANSION OF THE ARMIES OF EITHER SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AGREEMENT ON A COMMON CEILING WOULD DO MUCH TO MEET THE CONCERNS

OF BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE FUTURE COURSE OF MILITARY  
DEVELOPMENTS ON BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE.

8. THAT IS THE LOGIC WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING  
WHEN ONE TALKS OF A COMMON CEILING IT IS ALSO  
RELEVANT TO CONSIDER WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN HAPPENING  
TO THE RELATIVE SIZES OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE  
TWO SIDES IN RECENT YEARS. IN DOING THIS, I WISH TO  
DEAL ONLY WITH THE FACTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS THEY

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

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P R 112032Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1566

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 1189

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

CARRY FOR SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IF ONE  
COMPARES THE SITUATION TODAY WITH THE SITUATION SIX  
YEARS AGO WHEN THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH MY COLLEAGUES  
AND I REPRESENT FIRST PROPOSED, AT REYKJAVIK,  
NEGOTIATIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE,  
THERE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY NO CHANGE IN THE NUMBER  
OF MEN IN THE GROUND FORCES MAINTAINED BY NATO IN

THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. OVER THIS SAME PERIOD, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN AN OVERALL INCREASE IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE. SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA HAS INCREASED MORE THAN 25 PERCENT AND AS A CONSEQUENCE OVERALL WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE STRENGTH BY 12 PERCENT.

9. MR CHAIRMAN, THESE INCREASES ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH THESE NEGOTIA-  
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TIONS ARE TAKING PLACE. THEY HAVE HAPPENED OVER A PERIOD DURING WHICH POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE SHOWN SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT AND DURING WHICH, AS I HAVE SAID, THERE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY NO INCREASE IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF NATO FORCES. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE FACTS IT SHOULD SURPRISE NO ONE THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ARE CONCERNED AT THE DISPARITY IN TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH IN LARGE MEASURE RESULTS FROM THE INCREASES ON THE EASTERN SIDE OVER RECENT YEARS.

10. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES FOR LEAVING THE EXISTING FORCE RATIOS UNCHANGED. TO DO THIS WOULD NOT BE AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH; RATHER, IT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF FREEZING A ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE. IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO SUBSCRIBE TO AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD OBLIGE THEM TO ACCEPT AND FORMALLY SANCTION A PERMANENT POSITION OF GROUNDFORCE INFERIORITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RIGHT APPROACH IS TO BRING THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES TO A LEVEL OF EQUALITY SO AS TO CREATE A STABLE BASIS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE AND LASTING AGREEMENT.

11. MR CHAIRMAN, A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IS NOT ONLY A JUST AND FITTING OBJECTIVE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT ALSO OFFERS IMPORTANT PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES. BECAUSE IT IS SIMPLE, FAIR, AND READILY UNDERSTOOD, ITS ADOPTION, AS A NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE, IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD BE ENDORSED BY PUBLIC OPINION ON BOTH SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP TO CREATE THE NECESSARY CLIMATE OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN WHICH TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE ADOPTION OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD ALSO GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS A DEFINITE STRUCTURE AND A FINITE AND SPECIFIC GOAL.

12. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO OUR CHOICE OF  
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MANPOWER AS THE UNIT IN WHICH THE COMMON CEILING FOR  
GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE EXPRESSED. MANPOWER IS THE  
MOST BASIC, MOST EFFECTIVE AND MOST UNIVERSALLY  
APPLICABLE YARDSTICK BY WHICH THE STRENGTH OF GROUND  
FORCES HAS ALWAYS BEEN MEASURED. BY AIMING AT A  
SITUATION IN WHICH EACH SIDE HAS EQUAL NUMBERS OF  
SOLDIERS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WE SHOULD BE  
SETTING OURSELVES AN UNAMBIGUOUS OBJECTIVE WHICH  
LEAVES NO ROOM FOR MISINTERPRETATION OR MISUNDER-  
STANDING.

13. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES  
THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY GROUND FORCES  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE BUT ALSO AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES.  
WE BELIEVE THAT TO CONSIDER THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF  
THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD GREATLY COMPLICATE OUR WORK  
AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING  
USEFUL RESULTS, WITHOUT ADDING APPRECIABLY TO THE  
SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE.

14. MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE, IN HIS STATEMENT ON THE  
31ST OF JANUARY, HAS EXPLAINED WHY WE BELIEVE THAT  
THE ELIMINATION OF THE DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES,  
RATHER THAN A REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA,  
IS THE RIGHT WAY TO DIMINISH THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR  
BREAKING OUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

15. MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE THAT TO SEEK TO  
INCLUDE AIRFORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TO RISK  
BECOMING INVOLVED IN STERILE EFFORTS TO MAKE COMPARI-  
SONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF AIRCRAFT ON WHICH IT  
WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT.  
MOREOVER, EVEN IF WE ASSUME THAT AGREEMENT COULD IN  
PRINCIPLE BE REACHED ON REDUCING AIR FORCES, IT IS  
QUESTIONABLE HOW MUCH THIS WOULD ADD TO PUBLIC  
CONFIDENCE OR WOULD IN PRACTICE DIMINISH THE RISK  
OF CONFLICT SINCE AIRCRAFT WITHDRAWN FROM THE RE-  
DUCTIONS AREA COULD RETURN TO IT IN A MATTER OF  
HOURS. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GDR POINTED OUT ON  
THE 24TH OF JANUARY THAT: "AIR FORCE MOBILITY INCREASES  
THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACKS". BUT IT IS JUST  
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BECAUSE OF THIS MOBILITY AND THE EASE WITH WHICH  
AIRCRAFT CAN BE INTRODUCED INTO THE AREA OR MISSIONS  
MOUNTED AGAINST TARGETS IN THE AREA FROM BASES  
OUTSIDE IT, THAT WE DONOT THINK IT WOULD SIGNIFI-  
CANTLY INCREASE SECURITY TO APPLY REDUCTIONS TO AIR  
FORCES WITHIN THE AREA. AN AGREEMENT WHOSE EFFECTS  
COULD BE REVERSED WITHIN A FEW HOURS WOULD DO LITTLE  
TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE OR ENHANCE STABILITY. IF ON  
THE OTHER HAND WE CAN CONCENTRATE ON ELIMINATING THE  
DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, WHICH ARE THE PRESENT  
MAIN SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN THE AREA, WE SHALL  
ACHIEVE A RESULT THAT WILL DEMONSTRABLY ENHANCE  
STABILITY AND WHICH WOULD BE CERTAIN TO INCREASE  
THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.

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ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1567

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 1189

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

16. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR

GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CREATION OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. THE RISK OF WAR WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN A PRACTICABLE AND MEASURABLE WAY, AND THE SENSE OF MILITARY SECURITY AND STABILITY SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED.

17. AT THE SAME TIME, AT THE LEVEL OF ABOUT 700,000 MEN WHICH WE HAVE SUGGESTED, EACH SIDE WOULD IN OUR VIEW RETAIN AN ADEQUATE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. IN SHORT, NEITHER SIDE WOULD ENJOY A ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER AND THE SECURITY OF ALL WOULD BE ENHANCED.

18. MOREOVER, THE COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE  
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MANPOWER, ONCE ESTABLISHED, WOULD BE LESS LIKELY THAN ANY OTHER OUTCOME TO LOSE ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A GUARANTEE OF A STABLE RELATIONSHIP EVEN IN THE FACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. UNLIKE OTHER MORE COMPLEX CRITERIA OF MILITARY CAPABILITY, THE MANPOWER YARDSTICK CAN BE EXPECTED TO RETAIN ITS VALIDITY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, AND A COMMON CEILING WILL THUS REPRESENT A DURABLE ELEMENT OF STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE.

19. MR. CHAIRMAN, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED OUR CONVICTION THAT AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE THE FORM OF A MORE NEARLY EQUAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES THAN EXISTS AT PRESENT; AND WE HAVE EXPLAINED WHY THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND THE MOST COMPREHENSIBLE EXPRESSION OF SUCH EQUALITY. EQUALITY HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS THE GUIDELINE FOR MANY OTHER SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS, AND AS THE STANDARD BY WHICH THEIR RESULTS HAVE BEEN JUDGED. WHY THEN SHOULD IT NOT APPLY TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON WHICH WE ARE NOW ENGAGED? END TEXT. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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